
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13 April 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Management Committee

SUBJECT: Report of Working Group on Operations Centers, Information Flows, etc.

- 1. Attached herewith is the Working Group report. A second report will deal with the reports function.
- 2. We recommend the transformation of the present Operations Center into a true Operations Center, using the full data-processing facilities of the Agency as they develop. Our specific recommendations are in Paragraphs 18-21. If accepted, they will provide a single, central point for:
 - --Scanning of electrical narrative traffic arriving in Headquarters from all sources for items of immediate concern.
 - --Alerting of senior Agency officials, action officers, and external consumers.
 - --Selection of important traffic for senior Agency officers.
 - --Response to queries from other government agencies when no established channel exists.
 - --Crisis management and task force activities.
 - --Monitoring of all Agency activities in non-duty hours.
- 3. We believe the steps recommended for immediate action (Phase 1) with the exception of the recommendation (181) to negotiate a National Intelligence Operations Center, are desirable in themselves



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and will meet these objectives in the short term. NIOC, however desirable, will probably not be obtainable unless a decision is made to continue into Phase III (computerized dissemination system). On the other hand, the Agency can, and we believe should, proceed toward Phase III whether or not NIOC is established.

- 4. We are agreed on our recommendations as they stand, but we believe there is an issue which the Management Committee itself should decide. The last point in Para 2 uses the word "monitoring." The Committee should decide whether this should be "command," "control," "supervise," "monitor," "be cognizant of," or whatever. The problem is not semantic; it is whether the Deputies want to impose a command structure, however nominal, over their various non-duty hours activities. An orderly mind would argue that there should be such a structure: the rebuttal is that we have gone along very wel without. My view is that the present arrangement would suffice if we never had to face another major crisis, but October 1962 should have taught us that haphazard arrangements will not hold up under real stress.
- 5. DDM&S has decided not to have a duty officer because of the presence of duty officers in several of his components. These officers are in contact with the Operations Center, however, and the practical arrangements are workable.
- 6. We believe our recommendations are adaptable to any major changes in the Agency structure that may be coming, but changes in detail will of course be necessary.

7. Estimated costs can be summarized as follows:

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Phase I - A maximum of 20 people to man four 24-hour positions (six of these are absorbable; ten are interim); approximately in one-time costs; no space.

Phase II - No additional CIA personnel; in one-time costs, depending on study of FMSAC/SSOC move (these

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estimates are tentative); 3,000-5,000 square feet of space.

Phase III - Dependent on CDS.

- 8. We recognize the bind on space. Recommendation 18j can only be carried out by displacing SAVA, although as a temporary quick fix some OCI staff space across the corridor from the present Center could be cleared.
 - 9. The Report has five annexes.
 - --Annex A is our charter from the Management Committee.
 - --Annex B is the notebook containing an inventory of Agency centers and their interrelations.
 - --Annex C is an initial estimate of resource requirements.
 - --Annex D contains specific recommendations for disposition of the Agency's secondary 24-hour centers.
 - --Annex E is the NIOC prospectus of 8 January. (The cost estimates in this paper are out of date and should be ignored.)

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Richard Lehman Director of Current Intelligence